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T HE "product liability revolution" of the past two decades
has increased manufacturers' exposure to liability' in three re-
lated respects: the persons who may sue, the theories under which
they may claim and the duration of the manufacturer's responsibility.
The number of persons who can sue for product-caused injuries has
increased because the requirement of privity has been relaxed for
causes of action not sounding in negligence. This process began in
New York, as in many states, with decisions that allowed members of
the purchaser's household to recover for defective foodstuffs;2 was
extended to encompass remote purchasers relying on express warran-
ties3 and, subsequently, remote purchasers asserting breach of implied
warranties; 4 and finally permitted bystanders, or persons entirely
outside the chain of privity, to recover for personal injuries and prop-
erty damage caused by defective products.5 In terms of the available
theories of liability, negligence has been expanded by elimination of
the "patent danger" rule; 6 breach of implied warranties now encom-
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1964, J.D. 1966, Univer-
sity of Iowa; B. Litt. 1968, Oxford University. This Article is adapted from a study
prepared by the author for the New York State Law Revision Commission.
1. Others besides manufacturers have been adversely affected by recent devel-
opments in product liability law, but because the problem under discussion is most
acute for manufacturers, reference will typically be to them. See generally Model
Uniform Product Liability Act § 102(D), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,717 (1979).
"'Product liability claim' includes any claim or action brought for harm caused by
the manufacture, production, making, construction, fabrication, design, formula,
preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing, pack-
aging, storage, or labelling of the relevant product. It includes, but is not limited to,
any action previously based on: strict liability in tort; negligence: breach of express
or implied warranty; breach of, or failure to discharge, a duty to warn or instruct,
whether negligent or innocent; misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure,
whether negligent or innocent; or under any other substantive legal theory." Id.
2. Greetberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1961); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
3. See Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
4. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
5. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
6. This rule relieved a manufacturer from liability if the danger created by the
machine was open and obvious, that is, if the defect was patent. Micallef v. Miehie
Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 378, 348 N.E.2d 571, 574, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 119 (1976)
(overruling Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950)).
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passes design and warning as well as manufacturing defects; 7 and a
cause of action for "strict products liability" has been recognized., The
duration of the manufacturer's responsibility has increased not only
because persons more remote in the privity chain-or even outside
it-are permitted to sue, but also because the plaintiffs have a choice
among statutes of limitation. The plaintiff who asserts a negligence
claim has three years, measured from the date of the injury, in which
to bring suit; 9 but until 1975 the New York plaintiff not claiming in
negligence was limited by the warranty statute, which was measured
from the date the defendant sold the product.10 Thus, it was possible
for a claim to be barred before any injury had occurred. With the
decision in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.," however, the
Court of Appeals held that the cause of action for strict products
liability sounded in tort and was governed by the three-years-from-
date-of-injury limitation statute.'2  The Victorson decision meant
that the non-negligent manufacturer of a defective product could be
held liable many years after the product had left its hands, a situation
frequently described as a "long-tail" problem.13
7. See, e.g., Cawley v. General Motors Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 768, 769, 324
N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Tirino v. Kenner Prods. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 1094,
1096, 341 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
8. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 469-70 (1973).
9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214(4), (5) (McKinney Supp. 1981); see, e.g., Beninati
v. Oldsmobile Div., 94 Misc. 2d 835, 839, 405 N.Y.S.2d 917, 920 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
10. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 343-44, 253 N.E.2d
207, 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969), overruled, Victorson v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335 N.E.2d 275, 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1975).
The limitation period for warranty actions applied in Mendel was six years, and that
is still the period applicable to warranties outside the Uniform Commercial Code.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 213(2) (McKinney 1972). Warranties arising under the Code
are subject to a four-year statute. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1977).
11. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
12. Id. at 399-400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
13. The description comes from the shape of the graph drawn with claims paid
on one axis and years from manufacture on the other:
Claims Paid I /"
Years from Manufacture
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There are several possibly detrimental consequences of extending
the duration of the manufacturer's responsibility. First, it may be
difficult to "cost in" tort liability over a period of ten, twenty, thirty
or more years,' 4 given the uncertainties of future economic develop-
ments with their effects on damages, to say nothing of the uncertain-
ties of the legal standards that will be applied.1 5 Second, the manu-
facturers most consistently exposed to these risks are those producing
capital goods, such as industrial machinery.' 6 These manufacturers
sell relatively few products and, therefore, may be less able to "pass
through" the costs in the price of new machines.1 7 Third, if they do
attempt to pass the costs through to customers, older producers, with
liability exposure from units already in place, would be at a substan-
tial competitive disadvantage compared to new entrants into the mar-
ket.'8  Fourth, regardless of what the law may be, there are substan-
tial risks in trying cases involving older products.' For example,
A statute of repose can cut off that "tail":
Claims Paid
Years from Manufacture
For a statistical analysis of the long-tail problem, see New York State Insurance
Dep't, Product Liability Insurance-Supplemental Report 1, reports 5-6 (July 2,
1980); Insurance Services Office, Product Liability Closed Claim Survey: A Techni-
cal Analysis of Survey Results 78 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ISO Survey]. For a
general discussion of the long-tail problem, see Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed
Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations. 56 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 66S
(1978); Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: The Asault Upon the
Citadel of Strict Liability, 23 S.D. L. Rev. 149, 153 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Statutes of Repose].
14. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final
Report VII-22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Interagency Task Force Final Report].
15. See id. at 1-28.
16. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
17. Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at VII-22.
18. Id. at VI-27. Product liability insurance typically covers claims made during
the policy period. Id. at V-5, VII-20; Comment, Alabama's Products Liability
Statute of Repose, 11 Cum. L. Rev. 163, 166 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Product
Liability in Alabama].
19. See Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at 1-28.
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there is a greater chance that the product has been subjected to a
modification or misuse that the jury will say the manufacturer should
have foreseen; there is also an increased risk that the jury, no matter
how instructed, will use a hindsight perspective rather than evaluate
the product by the state of the art at the time it was produced.20
Finally, even if a manufacturer of an older product is able to prevail
on the merits at trial, the investigation and processing of claims is an
expensive procedure, and the expense is greater when witnesses and
records are difficult to obtain or have long since disappeared. 2 1
The manufacturers' increased exposure to liability for defective
products was accompanied in the middle and late 1970's by greatly
increased premium charges for product liability insurance. 22  The
relationship between these phenomena, especially the question of the
need for premium increases of the magnitude that were imposed, has
been the subject of much controversy and some research.2 3 It is clear,
20. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 110 analysis, 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, 62,734 (1979); Phillips, supra note 13, at 664; Statutes of Repose, supra note
13, at 171.
21. Missouri Senate Select Comm. on Product Liability, Report 8, at 11 (1977),
reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Interagency Task Force on Product Liability,
Selected Papers 549, 563 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Interagency Task Force Selected
Papers].
22. See Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at VII-21; U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final Report of
the Insurance Study by McKinsey & Co. 2-13 to -33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Interagency Task Force Insurance Study].
23. The research having the broadest base was conducted by the Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability, created by the President's Economic Policy Board in
1976. The Task Force commissioned independent contractors to do studies regarding
the apparent product liability problem. Industry aspects of the problem were studied
by Gordon Associates, Inc. and published in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability, Final Report of the Industry Study by Gordon
Assocs. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Interagency Task Force Industry Study]; insur-
ance aspects were studied by McKinsey & Company, Inc. and published in Inter-
agency Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 22; and legal aspects were studied by
The Research Group, Inc. and published in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability, Final Report of the Legal Study by The Research
Group, Inc., (1977) [hereinafter cited as Interagency Task Force Legal Study]. The
Task Force submitted its final report, based on those studies and other data it
developed, in 1977. Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, ch. I. Other
studies of the problem have taken the form of legislative hearings. E.g., Product
Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment and
Business Opportunities of the House of Rep. Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Small Business Hearings]; Product Liabil-
ity Insurance: Hearings on S. 403 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as S. 403 Hearings]; Impact on Product Liability: Hearings Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Missouri
Select Comm. on Product Liability, Report (1977), reprinted in Interagency Task
Force Selected Papers, supra note 21, at 549; Hearings on S. 5817, S. 5681, S. 6264,
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in any event, that the increasing cost of product liability insurance is a
multifaceted problem;2 4 one widely suggested "reform," at least in the
sense of reducing claims and expenses, has been the adoption of
statutes terminating a seller's responsibility after a specified time has
passed. 25 These statutes are commonly known, and will be described
in this Article, as "statutes of repose."
The simplest form of a statute of repose would typically provide
that "no cause of action may be brought against the seller of a defec-
tive product for injuries occurring more than ten years after the seller
sold the product." Such a statute is distinguishable from a "statute of
limitation," which ordinarily begins to run when there has been a
breach of the obligation.2 6 The statute of limitation thus puts a time
limit on the plaintiff's right to seek a remedy for a breach. The statute
of repose, on the other hand, limits the obligation itself.2- Injuries
occurring after the running of the statute of repose do not constitute
breaches of the obligation, since the obligation exists only during the
statutory period. Similar policies lie behind the two types of statutes.
Both serve to protect courts and defendants against the difficulties and
uncertainties resulting from stale or unavailable evidence.28 More-
over, both promote more efficient use of resources by permitting
potential defendants to "close their books" regarding possible claims
and to devote the released reserves to productive functions.29 The
principal difference between them is that the statute of limitation
implicitly indicates disapproval of those plaintiffs who "sleep on their
and S. 6883 Before the N.Y. Senate Subcomm. on Product Liability (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as N.Y. Senate Product Liability Hearings]: Defense Research Institute,
Inc., Products Liability Position Paper No. 9 (1976); Statutes of Repose, supra note
13, at 167 n. 113. See generally Note, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and
Statutes of Limitations, 11 Ind. L. Rev. 693, 694-99 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Products Liability].
24. Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at 1-20 to -31.
25. E.g., House Small Business Hearings, supra note 23, passim (submission by
William Logan); N.Y. Senate Product Liability Hearings, supra note 23 (submissions
of Edward Reinfut, Jeffrey J. Zogg and Dennis B. Connally), Interagency Task Force
Insurance Study, supra note 22, at 4-92: see ABA, Tort Reform and Related Pro-
posals, passim (B. Levin & R. Coyne eds. 1979). Twenty-two states have adopted
statutes of repose. See statutes cited infra note 36.
26. See generally Address by William McGovern, The Status and Variety of
Statutes of Limitation and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions, Joint
General Session, ABA Convention, at 3-6 (Honolulu, Aug. 5, 1980) [hereinafter cited
as McGovern Address].
27. Id. at 4.
28. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177,
1185 (1950); Statutes of Repose, supra note 13, at 168-69.
29. See Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-
Blueprintsfor Non-action, 18 Cath. U. L. Rev. 361, 377 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Limitation of Action Statutes].
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rights," while the statute of repose operates to bar some plaintiffs no
matter how diligent they may be in asserting their claims.30
Adoption of statutes of repose has been recommended not only by
interested parties, such as manufacturers, their insurers and trade
associations, 31 but also by the United States Department of Com-
merce, under whose direction the most comprehensive impartial study
of product liability problems was conducted in 1976 and 1977.32 The
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, published by the Department
in 1979, 33 includes a provision limiting the duration of a seller's re-
sponsibility to the product's "useful safe life," 34 which is presumed not
to exceed ten years. 35 As of January 1, 1982, twenty-two states had
adopted statutes of repose applicable to product liability actions or
had statutes of limitation that had been interpreted as statutes of
repose. 37 Most of those statutes, unlike the Model Uniform Product
30. See id. at 378-79.
31. See sources cited supra note 25.
32. See Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14. The Task Force
recommended a ten-year statute of repose to protect manufacturers of workplace
goods and a ten-year statute for consumer goods that would allow claims for "aettal
economic losses" after that period when the defect "was present in the product at the
time it was sold (e.g., long-term risk from a pharmaceutical)." Id. at VII-28 to -29.
33. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). An earlier
version, the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, was published in 44 Fed. Beg.
2996 (1979).
34. Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 110(A)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,
62,732 (1979).
35. id. § 110(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,732 (1979).
36. Ala. Code § 6-5-502(c) (Supp. 1979); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (1982):
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1978); Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a
(1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 105-
106(b)(2) (Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 6-1403 (Supp. 1980); I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, §
22.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp.
1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.310(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 600.5805(9) (Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.03 (West Supp.
1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224(2) (Supp. 1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2(1I)
(Supp. 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-02
(Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905(2) (1979), R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(2) (Supp,
1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-
103 (1980); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977). In addition, Connecticut, Kansas,
North Carolina and Oregon have tort limitations provisions measured from the act or
omission complained of, thus serving as statutes of repose. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. §§
52-577, -584 (1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) (1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16)
(Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115(2), (3) (1979). The Oregon statute is limited to
negligent injuries. Id. The Kansas statute, however, has been construed as a custom-
ary statute of limitations running from the injury, with the ten-year repose limitation
applicable only to injuries not reasonably discoverable at the time they accrue.
Ruthrauff v. Kensinger, 214 Kan. 185, 195, 519 P.2d 661, 667 (1974). For statutes of
repose applicable to architects and contractors and to medical malpractice actions,
see infra note 158.
37. E.g., Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-577, -584 (1981), construed in Prokolkin
v. General Motors Corp., 170 Conn. 289, 294-97, 365 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (1976),
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Liability Act, have absolute cutoffs, with the applicable periods rang-
ing from five to twelve years.38
This Article considers whether it is necessary or desirable for New
York to adopt a statute of repose applicable to product liability claims.
Consideration is also given to the form such a statute should take, if a
favorable decision as to its adoption is reached.
I. THE NEED FOR A STATUTE OF REPOSE
The need for a statute of repose is a difficult matter to determine.
Many persons and organizations have asserted that there is a signifi-
cant "long-tail" problem and that some device must be adopted to
relieve the burdens it imposes, especially those upon manufactur-
ers. 39 Often these calls for "reform" are accompanied by reference to
situations supposedly illustrating the need:
Just a few miles north of here, a man made a screw machine
years ago .... Last fall he was sued for over a quarter million
dollars. That machine has changed hands four times. It has been
modified at least three or four times in that period of time. A man
was injured on that thing and now he is suing for a quarter of a
million dollars. The suit was filed, I think, in Atlanta, Georgia.
This man has to take himself and some of his staff down there to
spend maybe three or four days, or maybe a week or ten days,
testifying on this thing and the amount of money involved in this
thing, no one knows. And he is right to the point now of whether to
continue buying product liability insurance or not buying and
taking a chance of another lawsuit. If he has another lawsuit and
loses it, he will be out of business. He has already closed a foundry
with 25 people employed because of this thing. He cannot afford
the product liability [insurance] for the foundry. He has closed it
down-there are 25 people out of work. 40
Full documentation of these incidents is infrequently provided, and
the subsequent history of the claim-for example, whether it was
dismissed on summary judgment-is often lacking. 4'
Of course, there are situations in which enough information is
available to ensure that the claims are not just figments of the imagi-
nation or distorted rumors. For example, the leading New York case
of Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 42 involved a twenty-one-
year-old laundry centrifuge extractor that injured a customer's child
Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115(1) (1979), construed in Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 270 Or.
694, 706-09, 530 P.2d 53, 59-60 (1974).
38. See infra pt. II(A)(3).
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. Missouri Senate Select Comm. on Product Liability, Report 9 (1977), re-
printed in Interagency Task Force Selected Papers, supra note 21, at 561.
41. See Interagency Task Force Selected Papers, supra note 21, at 305-27.
42. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
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who was able to stick his arm in it before it stopped spinning. 43 In
this instance the case went to the Court of Appeals, which allowed the
plaintiff to assert a strict liability claim, running from the date of
injury, even though a breach of warranty claim would have been
barred because the injury occurred more than four years after the
manufacturer sold the machine. 44 The problem is that there is little
data indicating whether cases like Victorson are common or relatively
rare.
A. Empirical Data
The best empirical data available come from a study conducted by
the Insurance Services Office (ISO), the statistical agency of the insur-
ance industry. 45  The study was an analysis of 24,452 records of
product liability claims closed by twenty-three major liability insurers
from July 1, 1976 to March 15, 1977. 41 The principal findings of the
ISO survey relevant to the present question are indicated in the fol-
lowing table:
TABLE 1
TIME FROM MANUFACTURE TO OCCURRENCE
BODILY INJURY CLAIMS
17
Cumulative % of Cumulative %
Time Interval Injured Parties of Payment
Up to 12 months 83.1% 49.4%
Up to 48 months 93.2 80.5
Up to 96 months 96.4 90.1
Up to 120 months 97.2 93.4
Up to 144 months 97.7 94.3
Number of Incidents 6,711
Average Payment $24,791
Thus, 83.1% of persons injured, accounting for 49.4% of bodily
injury payments made, suffered their injuries within one year of the
product's manufacture. Within four years of manufacture, 93.2% of
personal injuries (80.5% of ultimate payments) had been incurred.
43. Id. at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
44. Id.
45. See ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 78.
46. Id. at 7. See generally Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at
V-29 to -33 (critique of and response to ISO methodology); Interagency Task Force
Selected Papers, supra note 21, at 103-27 (same).
47. ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 81. For more complete data, see id. at 228,
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However, 3.6% of the injuries, accounting for 9.9% of payments,
took place more than eight years after manufacture and 2.3 % (5.7 %
of payments) occurred more than twelve years after manufacture.
The long-tail problem appears considerably more serious if the
claims for capital goods are isolated, as shown in Table 2:
TABLE 2
TIME FROM MANUFACTURE TO OCCURRENCE-CAPITAL GOODS ONLY
BODILY INJURY CLAIMS
48
Cumulative % of Cumulative %
Time Interval Injured Parties of Payment
Up to 12 months 38.3% 33.4%
Up to 48 months 66.9 68.4
Up to 96 months 78.5 82.6
Up to 120 months 83.5 87.1
Up to 144 months 86.0 87.6
Number of Incidents 480
Average Payment $68,261
With capital goods, 21.5 % of the persons injured suffer their injuries
more than eight years after the product is manufactured and 14.0%
are injured by products more than twelve years old.
The data from the ISO study are confirmed by data from more
limited surveys regarding New York product liability claims. 49 For
48. Id. at 82. For more complete data, see id. at 230, 414.
49. A survey by the author of fully reported appellate decisions of the New York
courts from 1973 to 1980 showed the following:
Manufacture-Injury Sale-Injury
Years (cases) (cases)










be determined 32 2.
TOTAL 61 61
On file with the author, Fordham University School of Law. Two of the three cases
over ten years involved pharmaceuticals whose effects were not discovered for more
1982]
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example, a survey by the New York State Insurance Department of
4,548 product liability claims made against New York insurers during
the last half of 197950 indicated that 7.9 % of the 469 claims for which
information was available involved injuries or property damage that
occurred more than eight years after the product was manufactured
and 2.8 % of 1,241 claims involved injuries or property damage occur-
ring more than eight years after the product had been sold by the
insured. 5'
The ISO data suggest that even if a statute of repose as short as four
years were adopted, fewer than seven percent of the persons injured
by defective products would have their claims barred.5 2 These claims,
however, account for almost twenty percent of the product liability
payments made and for a somewhat larger percentage of claim pro-
cessing expenses.53  If the statute of repose were eight years, fewer
than four percent of injured parties, receiving about ten percent of the
payments, would be unable to assert their claims against the manufac-
turer.
than a decade; the third was a laundry centrifuge extractor. These data are very
limited in their value. They are based on appellate opinions, which represent a small
percentage of the cases filed and a relatively minute portion of the claims made.
Usually the appellate decisions are rendered only in the more important product
liability cases where complex issues must be resolved; there is, however, some indica-
tion that they tend to be more representative of the universe of cases in this area than
in other tort areas. Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at 1-13. In
any event, the small number of decisions surveyed precludes any statistically valid
conclusions.
50. N.Y. State Insurance Dep't, Product Liability Insurance-Supplemental Re-
port, report 1 (July 2, 1980). Pursuant to Act of July 13, 1979, ch. 692, § 4, 1979 N.Y.
Laws 1346, 1347, insurers are required to file semi-annual reports regarding product
liability insurance claims, cancellations and non-renewals with the Superintendent of
Insurance, who, in turn, is to report to the Governor and the Legislature a summary
of the data collected together with an assessment of the status of product liability
insurance costs and any recommendations for statutory or administrative changes.
The first report by the superintendent covered the six-month period ending Decem-
ber 31, 1979. N.Y. State Insurance Dep't, Product Liability Insurance- Report 3, 4
(May 30, 1980). Late-arriving data from that period required issuance of the Supple-
mental Report, supra, containing a claims analysis.
51. N.Y. State Insurance Dep't, Product Liability Insurance-Supplemental Re-
port, reports 6-7 (July 2, 1980); see also ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 83 (97.4 % of
bodily injuries, accounting for 90.5 % of payments, occurred within six years of the
product's purchase).
52. If these data are valid, the decision in Victorson, see supra notes 10-12 and
accompanying text, applying the three-years-from-injury statute of limitation, rather
than the four-years-from-sale contractual statute, to strict products liability claims
had the effect of allowing approximately an additional seven percent of injured
parties to assert their claims.
53. For each dollar of payment, the insurance company defending the claim
incurs an additional expense of 35 cents for bodily injury and 48 cents for property
damage. ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 11. Claim processing expenses are presumably
larger when older products are involved. See supra note 21 and accompanying text:
N.Y. State Insurance Dep't, Product Liability Insurance-Supplemental Report,
report 6 (July 2, 1980).
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Manufacturers and potential plaintiffs necessarily will view the
foregoing figures from different perspectives: From the manufactur-
er's point of view, a statute of repose would affect few people but
would permit rather substantial savings. From the perspective of
potential plaintiffs, however, a not insignificant number of persons
with more serious injuries could get no compensation from the manu-
facturer. Choosing between these perspectives requires further analy-
sis.
At the outset, it might be helpful to understand why the older cases
tend to account for more than their proportionate share of final
payments. The most likely reason for this phenomenon relates to the
kinds of products involved at the different time intervals; small claims
based on food products are disproportionately represented among the
claims arising soon after manufacture, 54 while older products causing
injury tend to be those with a greater capacity for serious conse-
quences. The ISO data indicate that more than forty percent of the
injuries occurring more than eight years after the product is manufac-
tured involve capital goods.55 The study does not indicate which
other product categories most frequently generated long-tail claims. It
is, however, possible to infer from the nature of products involved and
data on the incidence of all claims56 that, aside from capital goods,
automotive and medical products and chemicals were most likely to
cause personal injury more than eight years after manufacture.5, Au-
tomotive products tend to be quite durable, and medical products
tend either to be quite durable-for example, prosthetic devices-or
tend, as in pharmaceuticals, to have consequences that may appear a
substantial time after exposure. Aside from capital goods, it is not
possible to express in quantitative terms the impact of the categories of
products that give rise to long-tail claims. The ISO stud), did deter-
mine that more than twenty-one percent of the persons injured by
capital goods, accounting for almost eighteen percent of the payment
made, suffered injuries from products more than eight years old.5 8 At
least in that area, then, it appears that a statute of repose could have a
significant effect.
B. Likely Effects of a Statute of Repose in New York
From the manufacturer's or seller's point of view, the effects of a
statute of repose are likely to be related to the costs of claims, espe-
54. ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 77.
55. See id. at 35; Statutes of Repose, supra note 13, at 170-71.
56. Of 239 persons injured, 103, or 43%, were injured by capital goods. ISO
Survey, supra note 13, at 228, 230.
57. Id. at 35.
58. Id. at 82. For product lines specified as capital goods, see iW. at 519-25.
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cially to insurance premiums. 9 The adoption of the statute is not
likely to affect the manufacturer's primary conduct: Unlike other pos-
sible adjustments in the law, such as admitting evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, 60 the presence or absence of a statute of repose is
unlikely to change the care a manufacturer will exercise in design or
construction of its products.
Overall, a statute of repose of eight years would eliminate less than
ten percent of the total payments for product injuries. It could, how-
ever, provide manufacturers a little relief in their product liability
insurance rates."' In areas like capital goods, adoption of a statute of
repose would eliminate twenty percent of the claims, thereby perhaps
easing significantly the insurance rates manufacturers face.02  Even
for manufacturers of other types of products, for which the number of
claims is not significant, the subjectivity of the ratemaking process
may lead to lower premiums.6 3 There is some evidence that older
claims, or the fear of older claims, have a disproportionate effect
when rates are established. 4  Limiting the uncertainty associated
with those claims should permit rate reductions greater than their
actual incidence would otherwise suggest.
Against these arguments in favor of a statute of repose there are at
least two factors that would tend to reduce the net effects of a statute
of repose in New York. First, New York law already provides protec-
59. Costs incurred as a result of product liability include, in addition to insurance
premiums, losses paid within the deductible amount of the policy, company claims
handling, legal staff expenses and non-legal defense expenses. Interagency Task Force
Final Report, supra note 14, at VI-28.
60. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 122, 417 N.E.2d 545, 549,
436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (1981).
61. One underwriter told the Interagency Task Force, during the Insurance
Study, that simply alleviating one problem (through a statute of repose) would not be
sufficient justification for changing his company's underwriting posture; another
indicated that even a federal statute might not lead to a reduction in rates. Inter-
agency Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 22, at 4-92, 4-94. The Task Force's
final report is ambivalent and unspecific as to a statute's likely effects on insurance
rates. See Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at VII-23; Johnson,
Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L. Rev. 677, 690 n.66
(1978).
62. See Interagency Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 22, at 4-93.
63. The Interagency Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 22, concluded:
"Rates for product liability insurance are based largely or, for some products, en-
tirely on non-statistically derived, judgmental estimates of loss frequency and sever-
ity. Further, the rates can be modified, based on prior loss experience and nontangi-
ble factors. Thus, while actuarial considerations are a part of determining the
appropriate rate levels, the impact of the actuarial analysis on the final rate used is
minimal." Id. at 1-40; see Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at II-
9 to -17; see also Interagency Task Force Selected Papers, supra note 21, at 101-08
(comments of Insurance Services Office on Final Report); id. at 109-27 (reply of
Interagency Task Force staff).
64. Interagency Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 22, at 4-92.
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tion not found in some other states against problems associated with
long-tail claims. Almost all long-tail claims involving capital goods,
and possibly many others, arise from workplace injuries. 5  These
injuries often result from "defects" that are in fact, if not in law,
attributable to the employer-6 6 -for example, encouraging or permit-
ting unsafe uses of the products, maintaining improperly and making
modifications that decrease safety. 67  In some states, the manufac-
turer tends to be held liable if the employer's conduct can be said in
any sense to have been "foreseeable." 8 In New York, however, the
Court of Appeals has been somewhat more responsive to the manufac-
turer's position. In the first place, the plaintiff may not recover unless
the product was used in the manner that was intended 9 or, if the use
was not intended, that was reasonably foreseeable.70  The manufac-
turer's duty does not extend to designing or manufacturing a product
that is impossible to abuse, 7' and improper use by the plaintiff or a
third person bars the plaintiff's claim. 72  Furthermore, the manufac-
turer will not be held liable if modifications render a product defec-
tive that was not defective when it left the manufacturer's hands.
65. See product categories termed "capital goods" in ISO Survey. supra note 13,
at 519-25. Chemical products and some types of automotive products (e.g., trucks)
are frequently involved in workplace injuries. See Interagency Task Force Legal
Study, supra note 23, at 111-78, -79. Such products also have consequences far
removed from the date of manufacture. Id.
66. See Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at II-20S.
67. The ISO Survey indicated that 11.97c of all payments for personal injury
claims, and 14.0% of those for claims involving capital goods, were made in cases in
which the product had been modified by someone other than the injured party. ISO
Survey, supra note 13, at 107-08.
68. See Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23. at 11-201 to -214. For
a more complete discussion of this subject, see the dissenting opinion of Judge
Fuchsberg in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 48.3-86. 403 N.E.2d
440, 445-48, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 723-25 (1980) (Fuchsberg, J.. dissenting).
69. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622. 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 470 (1973).
70. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d 571. 577, 384
N.Y.-S.2d 115, 121 (1976); see Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 157-58, 305
N.E.2d 769, 772-73, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648-49 (1973).
71. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 480, 403 N.E.2d 440, 444,
426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980).
72. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973); see Halloran v. Virginia Chems., Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386,
392-93, 361 N.E.2d 991, 995-96, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346-47 (1977). But see Micallef
v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121
(1976) (manufacturer's obligation to design product to avoid user negligence). If the
product is found defective under New York's narrower standards, the manufacturer
may still assert misuse by the plaintiff or a third person, for example, the employer,
as a ground for reduction, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law art. 14-A (MeKinney 1976), or
apportionment, id. art. 14, of damages. See Guyot v. Al Charyn, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 79,
82, 417 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 (1979).
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Thus, in the recent case of Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division,73 the
Court of Appeals held that the manufacturer could not be held liable
for injuries resulting from modifications made by the employer that
rendered safety guards installed by the manufacturer ineffective. The
court's defendant-protective stance was evident from its decision
against liability even though the manufacturer knew before the ma-
chine was sold that the employer intended to make the dangerous
modifications and even though relatively inexpensive safer alterna-
tives were available to the manufacturer. 74
The foregoing suggests that to the extent workplace injuries involve
employer fault, which seems more likely as the age of the product
increases, a statute of repose might not add significantly to the legal
protection already given a manufacturer by New York law. Neverthe-
less, a statute of repose could make a difference in transaction costs.
Even under Robinson, a modification by the employer may present a
difficult question as to whether the manufacturer exercised reasonable
care in designing the product for unintended yet reasonably foresee-
able uses. 75 The defense provided by a statute of repose is much more
certain because it involves only a determination of significant dates.
Current New York law also provides protection to manufacturers of
products other than capital goods. This is especially true with phar-
maceuticals and chemicals, where the likelihood of successful long-tail
claims is already minimized by the rule that begins the running of the
statute of limitations with exposure to the deleterious substance, not
with discovery of the consequent injury. 7  When long-tail claims for
these products are allowed in other jurisdictions, it is probably be-
cause of a "discovery" rule, 77 rather than because the exposure did not
73. 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
74. Id. at 477-78, 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719, 721.
75. See id. at 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721-22.
76. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 781, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003,
417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1979); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 212, 218, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718, cert. denied, 374 U.S.
808 (1963). Of course, tolling provisions permit a long tail when the exposure occurs
during a period of incapacity, such as when an infant takes a drug with delayed side
effects.
77. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th
Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota law); Thrift v. Tenneco Chem. Inc., 381 F. Supp.
543, 545 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Williams v. Vick Chem. Co., 279 F. Supp. 833, 835-36
(S.D. Iowa 1967); Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 292, 386 A.2d 1310,
1314-15 (1978); Schiele v. Hobart Corp., 284 Or. 483, 489-90, 587 P.2d 1010, 1014
(1978); McCroskey v. Bryant Air Cond. Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1975);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) (1976); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516.100 (Vernon 1952); S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 512(4)
(Supp. 1981). See generally Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery




take place until many years after manufacture. A statute of repose,
therefore, would be unlikely to bar many claims not already barred
by the New York statute of limitations rule.
The second basis for arguing that a statute of repose would do little
to provide insurance rate relief to manufacturers is that New York la%%
applies to only eight percent of product liability claims nationwide for
personal injuries78 and only seven percent of claims for property dam-
age.79 Thus, for a statute of repose to have a significant effect on
insurance premiums, adoption would have to be much more gen-
eral. 80 Of course, adoption by New York might have greater effect if
either premium rates were calculated taking into account the particu-
lar law governing the individual manufacturer or if certain industries,
for example, the manufacture of capital goods, were disproportion-
ately governed by New York law. There is, however, no indication
that either is the case. 8'
From the point of view of injured persons, the arguments against a
statute of repose logically focus on its effect of depriving them of
compensation in some instances. - Certainly, the twenty percent of
persons injured by capital goods, and perhaps even the much smaller
percentages in other areas, seem significant numbers to those whose
claims the statutes would bar. In practical effect, however, those
numbers may be somewhat misleading. First, as previously noted,
many long-tail claims involve workplace injuries. Almost all capital
goods cases are of this nature and so, presumably, are many of the
cases involving older automotive products83 and chemicals. Most per-
sons injured in the workplace are covered by workers' compensation,
which means that even if claims against the manufacturer are barred
by a statute of repose, an injured party is unlikely to go totally
uncompensated for medical expenses and lost earnings.84  Of course,
78. See ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 27-28.
79. See id. at 28-29.
80. The 22 states that have enacted general or product liability statutes of repose,
see supra note 36, provide the law for 34 % of product liability personal injury claims
and 38% of product liability property damage claims. See id. at 27-29; Phillips,
supra note 13, at 672.
81. Product liability insurance rates are calculated on a nationwide basis. Inter-
agency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at 1-28. In the final analysis,
however, the premiums actually charged amount to "informed best guesses" of the
individual underwriter, affected by such factors as the competitive environment, the
insurer's overall capacity or limitations on the capacity that the insurance company
management is willing to devote to the line, potential defense costs, and myriad other
factors. Id. at V-10, -12.
82. E.g., id. at VII-24 to -25; Johnson, supra note 61, at 690-91.
83. Trucks, tractors and similar vehicles tend to have longer useful lives than
consumer automobiles. See supra note 65.
84. Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at 11-178 to -179; Prod-
ucts Liability, supra note 23, at 713, 723.
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the inadequacy of compensation benefits has been, in the view of
some, a major factor in the increasing number of suits against product
manufacturers and, perhaps, in making the courts generally more
amenable to product liability claims.85 That view implies a general
problem regarding compensation in the workplace, of which the
"long tail" is only a minor part. Product manufacturers, as well as
workers, would benefit more from a resolution of the problem
through reform of the workers' compensation system than from at-
tacking any of its inadequacies through a statute of repose. Second, as
has already been noted, many of the long-tail claims identified in the
ISO study are already barred under current New York law, so a
statute of repose would have no effect on the persons injured in those
cases. Many consumers who suffer product injuries outside the work-
place are already unable to recover from the manufacturer because of
the statute of limitations approach employed in New York for chemi-
cals and drugs.86 Others may find their opportunities to recover, or to
recover fully, restricted by doctrines regarding standards of care in
design,8 7 or the comparative fault doctrine. 8 Finally, it is possible to
draft a statute of repose that will not deprive injured consumers of
rights to compensation against proximate parties such as retailers, yet
will protect manufacturers against long-tail claims. 89
85. See, e.g., S. 403 Hearings, supra note 23, at 268 (statement of Prof. Davis);
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Products Liability: A MAPI Survey 30
(1976), reprinted in House Small Business Hearings, supra note 23, at 241. But see
Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at 111-99 to -101.
86. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
87. Under New York law, a design is defective if it is "not reasonably contem-
plated by the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended
use .... [T]he ultimate question in determining whether an article is defectively
designed involves a balancing of the likelihood of harm against the burden o] taking
precaution against that harm." Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479,
403 N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1980) (emphasis added). In contrast,
under California law, for example, a product may be found defectively designed if it
"fail[s] to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used In an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner," without regard to any risk-benefit
analysis. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 452,
455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234, 237-38 (1978) (emphasis and citations omitted). The
practical difference between the two approaches lies in the greater difficulty faced by
a Californian in obtaining a decision that the design is not defective as a matter of
law. The California approach, therefore, requires most cases to be sent to the jury,
thereby increasing transaction costs.
88. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law art. 14-A (McKinney 1976). If capital goods,
automotive products and industrial chemicals are excluded because the claimants
have access to other sources of compensation, such as workers' compensation, and
pharmaceuticals and other non-industrial chemicals because claimants are likely to
be barred from recovery for long-tail claims under current New York law, the
remaining categories of products likely to produce significant numbers of long-tall
claims, such as furniture and sporting goods, tend to result in smaller payments than
the excluded categories. See ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 35.
89. Although it would be possible to measure each defendant's obligation from
the date he last controlled the product, thereby giving consumers recovery against
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In sum, the available data suggest the following effects of a statute
of repose in New York. First, it might assist manufacturers of capital
goods by leading to some reduction in their product liability insurance
rates. At the same time, the workers' compensation system would
cushion almost all victims against being completely denied recovery
for their injuries. Second, so far as can be ascertained, the statute
would be unlikely to have any effect on the product liability insurance
rates of other manufacturers because the incidence of successful long-
tail claims is already very low. If a statute of repose were adopted,
some small percentage of consumers, probably not exceeding 1.5 % of
claimants with an eight-year statute and less with a longer one, 0
would be deprived of compensation from the parties protected by the
statute, although those claimants might well have access to other
sources such as immediate sellers and first-party insurance.
II. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS IF A STATUTE OF REPOSE
Is To BE RECOMMENDED
The implication of the foregoing is that neither great benefit will be
achieved nor great harm done if a statute of repose is adopted. Politi-
cal factors may tip the balance, but it is difficult to discern clear
policy elements strongly pointing one way or the other. Assuming that
a decision is made in favor of proposing new legislation, the remain-
der of this Article considers the important features of a statute of
repose.
A. A Proposal For Discussion
Because it will have little effect on the incidence or severity of
product injuries9' and will, if anything, only increase the social costs
proximate sellers while protecting the remote manufacturers, the economic costs of
precluding indemnification in such a situation are probably excessive. See infra note
105 and accompanying text.
90. This assumption is based on the fact that capital goods comprise more than
40%, and an inference that medical and industrial automotive products and chemi-
cals comprise an additional 20%, of the 3.6% of claims that are made for products
over eight years old. See ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 35; supra notes 55-5S and
accompanying text.
91. The presence of a statute of repose certainly provides no greater incentive to
take precautions than does its absence. At the same time, it is likely to have at most a
negligible effect in the other direction. Manufacturers of capital goods are already
subject to the deterrent forces of laws mandating safety devices, as well as market
forces penalizing manufacturers of unsafe equipment. Products Liability, supra note
23, at 714. Furthermore, it is rarely practical to make a design decision that could
take significant advantage of the statute's limit, given the small percentage of claims
that constitute the long-tail problem in the first place: it is highly questionable
whether many products, especially for consumers, are designed with much thought
given to possible injuries after fifteen, as compared to after eight, years. At that level,
the uncertainties are so great, and the incidence of injury so small, that risks are
avoided by insurance rather than design changes. But see id. at 714 & n.125.
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when losses are not spread, the principal objective of a statute of
repose must be to reduce the costs of administering the system. The
major "transaction costs" that the statute must remove are those re-
lated to uncertainty: uncertainty as to the duration of possible liabil-
ity, as to the amounts of potential liability and as to the legal stan-
dards that will be applied. 92 Thus, a statute of repose serves its
purpose only if it provides reasonable assurance to the manufacturer,
insurer or other responsible party that at some point there will be no
liability for injuries caused by the product. That reasonable assurance
can only be given if, at that time, a relatively uncomplicated determi-
nation can be made that the responsible party's liability has termi-
nated. Therefore, the principal criterion for the following suggestions
for a statute of repose is that, in most cases, the statute's applicability
should be determinable on a motion for summary judgment. 3
Although one effect of a statute of repose is inevitably to eliminate
claims that ultimately are or should be determined invalid, it is also
recognized that the statute will bar some claims that are truly valid.
The suggested statute is, therefore, intended to minimize the number
of valid claims cut off while having the maximum effect in reducing
the costs of other claims.
The principal features of a statute of repose are: (1) a definition of
its scope, in terms of legal theory, subject matter, parties covered and
so forth; (2) the event(s) that mark the beginning of its running; (3)
the length of the period; (4) the consequences of the running of the
period; and (5) any exceptions. 4 The following proposed statute
includes each of these features:
No person. shall have a cause of action for damages for
personal injury, wrongful death or injury to property
caused by a defective product, or for indemnification or
contribution with respect to liability for personal injury,
wrongful death or injury to property so caused, unless the
personal injury, death or injury to property occurred within
eight years after the product was manufactured. The fore-
going limitation shall not apply if the personal injury, death
or injury to property occurred within a longer period for
which the party against whom the cause of action is asserted
has expressly warranted the product. The foregoing limita-
tion shall not apply to causes of action for negligence in
repairing or maintaining a product.
92. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text. Even if strict application of
the legal rules means that the plaintiff will not be successful, uncertainty as to the
applicability of those rules or to whom they will be applied tends to encourage
litigation with its attendant expenses. See Interagency Task Force Final Report,
supra note 14, at 1-28.
93. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 3212 (McKinney Supp. 1981).




The suggested statute applies only to product liability claims, be-
cause it is meant to address the problems peculiar to such causes of
actions. Those cases are broadly defined by the injury and its causal
relation to a product, not by reference to legal theories such as negli-
gence, strict liability and warranty. In this area particularly, legal
theories can be ambiguous; 95 for example, in New York, "strict liabil-
ity" for a defectively designed product seems to require a showing of
lack of due care-that is, negligence.9 6 To avoid situations in which
the characterization is the sole determining factor of the repose pe-
riod 9 7 the definition of the scope of the statute mentions no theories,
except express warranty and negligence in repairs.9 Similarly, there
is no mention of the various types of product defects that could be
alleged, 99 because they also are ambiguous. Once again, a list could
encourage counsel to make characterization arguments and force
courts to make more difficult decisions than that implied in deciding
whether the plaintiff seeks damages for injury "caused by a defective
product." The proposal covers claims for personal injuries including
illness,100 property damage and wrongful death.' 0 ' As the last section
of this Article points out, there is no constitutional need to treat
95. See, e.g., Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400-02, 335
N.E.2d 275, 277-78, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41-43 (1975).
96. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 480, 403 N.E.2d 440, 444,
426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas
Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 62, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013-14 (1980).
97. This is already a problem with the causes of action for breach of warranty
and strict products liability for personal injuries to non-contracting users or by-
standers-in all respects save the statute of limitations the theories are identical.
Martin, 1978 Survey of New York Law-Torts, 30 Syracuse L. Rev. 555, 559 (1979):
see Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494-95 (1969), overruled, Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335 N.E.2d 275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1975). See generally
Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 591, 374 N.E.2d 97, 101, 403
N.Y.S.2d 185, 189 (1978) (cause of action accrues at time of injury), id. at 596, 374
N.E.2d at 104, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (same).
98. Other statutes, however, identify theories under which a cause of action may
be brought. Ala. Code § 6-5-501(2) (Supp. 1979): Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 22.2(a)(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-1 (Burns Supp. 1981);
N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-02(1) (Supp. 1981); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(b) (Supp.
1981); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977).
99. Several state statutes list the product defects that can be alleged. E.g., Ala.
Code § 6-5-501(2) (Supp. 1979); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-681(3) (1982): Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-21-401(2) (Supp. 1978); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 22.2(3) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-1982).
100. Illness is explicitly covered in the Illinois statute. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 21.2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
101. All the statutes of repose, except Georgia's, specifically apply to wrongful
death as well as personal injury and property damage claims. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 411.300 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(8)
(Supp. 1981-1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.03 (West Supp. 1982).
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wrongful death claims differently from other personal injury
actions; 02 nor is there any apparent policy justification for reducing a
defendant's protection in death cases. Economic loss is not mentioned
because it is either an element of the listed injuries or an element of
contractual damages that are not subject to the statute of repose. 03
The proposed statute specifically applies to claims for indemnifica-
tion or contribution arising out of injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts. 0 4  Because the repose period is measured for all defendants
from the date of manufacture to the date of injury, not to the date the
action is commenced, it will not place liability on those further along
the merchandising chain, such as retailers and distributors. Forcing
them to bear the responsibility for a significant number of claims
would be economically inefficient: Insurance is more expensive for
smaller units, and the deterrent effects of liability would only indi-
rectly reach the manufacturers and designers ultimately responsi-
ble.10 5 Although indemnification and contribution claims will extend
the period for which manufacturers and others at the head of the
chain must plan, as long as the period is measured from the same date
for all defendants,10 6 they will each enjoy the certainty that is the
statute's desired goal. While it is theoretically possible under the
proposal that a claim could be made against a manufacturer nineteen
or more years107 after the product was manufactured, in almost all
102. See infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
103. See Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 590, 374 N.E.2d 97,
100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188-89 (1978). The statute makes no distinction between
workplace and consumer injuries. This is consistent with the initial draft of the
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, Draft Uniform Product Liability Law §§
109(B) (1), (2), 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2999, 3000 (1979). But see Interagency Task Force
Final Report, supra note 14, at VII-28 to -29 (suggesting that it would be useful to
draw such a distinction).
104. The Connecticut and New Hampshire statutes include specific provisions
applying the repose period to indemnification and contribution claims, commonly
called "claims-over." Conn. Rev. Cen. Stat. § 52-577a (1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 507-D:2(II) (Supp. 1979). The New Hampshire statute extends the repose period by
an additional ninety days. Id. The Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana and Nebraska
statutes specifically do not apply to indemnification and contribution claims. Ala.
Code § 6-5-502(c) (Supp. 1979); Idaho Code § 6-1303 (Supp. 1980); I11. Ann. Stat.
ch. 83, § 21.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ind. Code § 34-4-20A-6 (Burns Supp.
1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224(3) (1979).
105. See Phillips, supra note 13, at 670.
106. Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at V-17 n.37; Siegel,
Procedure Catches Up-And Makes Trouble, 45 St. John's L. Rev. 62, 70 (1970). If
the statute were measured from the time each defendant sold or parted with posses-
sion and claims-over were not covered, the manufacturer's liability could be indefi-
nitely extended, especially for products having long shelf lives.
107. Such an extended length of time could ensue as a result of the following: eight
years repose period, plus three years personal injury limitation period as provided by
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982), plus two years litigation
or claim processing, plus six years indemnification or contribution limitation period
[Vol. 50
STATUTE OF REPOSE
instances the claim-over will be asserted earlier by impleader or the
manufacturer will receive other notice that the claim is pending. 10S In
any event, a separate indemnification or contribution action is less
likely to pose the same litigation problems for the manufacturer-
defendant as would an action equally far removed, in terms of time,
from the product's manufacture if brought by an injured plaintiff.
The proposed statute applies to all product liability actions, except
those founded on express warranty.0 9 The warranty exception recog-
nizes that a party who has made an express commitment is not subject
to the uncertainty that the statute is intended to avoid. This rationale
does not depend on the existence of a direct bargaining relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant: So long as the manufacturer has
represented that it will stand behind a product for a period longer
than the statute, it should not complain about a long-tail problem
when the ultimate consumer, or even a bystander, is injured." 0
A number of statutes of repose limit their application to certain
causes of action. For example, some apply only to strict liability
actions. 1' As previously noted, it is often difficult in practice to
arrive at the distinction between strict liability and negligence actions.
Such a limitation appears to have been adopted out of a concern that
manufacturers might escape liability for products that are constructed
or assembled in a negligent manner.1 2  Although empirical evidence
pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 213(2) (McKinney 1972). See McDermott v. City
of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 218-19, 406 N.E.2d 460, 463, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647
(1980).
108. The retailer would ordinarily want the manufacturer to assist in defending
the product liability claim; and even if the retailer undertook the defense alone, it
would have a strong incentive to assert the claim-over as soon as possible after an
adverse judgment had been rendered.
109. Eight states exclude express warranties from their statutes of repose. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (1982); Idaho Code § 6-1303(1)(b) (Supp. 1981); 111. Ann.
Stat. ch. 83, § 21.2(4)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982): Ind. Code § 34--20A-1
(Burns Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 28.01.1-02 (Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977). The statutes of
Alabama, Connecticut and New Hampshire also exclude express warranties when the
warranty is in writing. Ala. Code § 6-5-502(c) (Supp. 1979): Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. §
52-577a (Supp. 1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2 (IV) (Supp. 1979). Because
the accrual of a cause of action is not relevant under the proposal, the problem
presented by the ambiguity in U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1977). which provides a separate
accrual date when a warranty "explicitly extends to future performance," is avoided.
See generally Phillips, supra note 13, at 669-70 (discussing interpretation problems
created by UCC language).
110. Cf. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 15, 181
N.E.2d 399, 407, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 370 (1962) (breach of express warranty).
111. E.g., .Ga. Code Ann. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1981): 11. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, §
21.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(9) (Supp.
1981-1982).
112. See Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at \II-24. By the
same reasoning, the Task Force recommended that any statute of repose have an
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is scanty, it would seem that such products rarely would survive the
statutory period to cause injury. The limitation, therefore, is of ques-
tionable merit. Limitation to strict liability claims may also reflect the
perception that these cases cause most of the problem and a belief that
older negligence claims are self-policing in that the plaintiff's burdens
of proof become more difficult to satisfy."-- Permitting a negligence
action, however, would leave the courts open to the design and warn-
ing defect cases that constitute most, if not all, of the long-tail prob-
lem.1 4
One state excludes all warranty actions from its statute of re-
pose. 5 The proposed statute only excludes express warranties from
its coverage. Implied warranties actually find their source in the law
rather than in an agreement between the parties; consequently, unlike
warranties that are express, they should be treated the same as tort
actions for negligence and strict products liability." 0 Other states
make the statute of repose inapplicable when the defendant has com-
mitted fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclo-
sure. 7  This exception creates an open invitation for plaintiffs to
plead, for example, that the manufacturer committed "constructive
fraud" in marketing the product with its alleged defect." 8 Once
again, placing this sort of question before the court engenders the
uncertainty the statute is intended to avoid.
The proposed statute operates in favor of all persons who may incur
liability if the product is defectively designed, manufactured, assem-
bled, packaged or labelled. The precise specification of "manufac-
turer, assembler or distributor"" 9 is avoided because it might be read
too narrowly and preclude some who should have the protection. The
one class of possible defendants who should not be within the scope of
exception for defects present in the product at the time it was sold. Id. at VII-28 to
-29. As the report noted, "this compromises the apparent concreteness of the format
of this remedy." Id. at VII-24.
113. See Defense Research Institute, Products Liability Position Paper No. 9, at 22
(1976); Product Liability in Alabama, supra note 18, at 171.
114. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Products Liability, supra
note 23, at 718 (forecasting expanded use of res ipsa loquitor in that event).
115. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-1 (Burns Supp. 1981).
116. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589, 374 N.E.2d 97, 99-
100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (1978).
117. See, e.g., Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a (1981); Idaho Code § 6-
1303(2)(b)(2) (Supp. 1980); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2(IV) (Supp. 1979).
118. See Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 321, 325, 157 Cal. Rptr.
779, 782 (1979).
119. For example, the Illinois statute defines "seller" as "one who, in the course of
a business conducted for the purpose, sells, distributes, leases, assembles, installs,
produces, manufactures, fabricates, prepares, constructs, packages, labels, markets,
repairs, maintains, or otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of
commerce." Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 21.2(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
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the statute's protection are those who only repair or maintain the
product; 12 0 they cannot be held responsible for design defects and thus
are seldom, if ever, subject to long-tail liability. Furthermore, appli-
cation of the statute would bar timely claims, even though those
claims pose no long-tail difficulties for those who maintain or repair.
2. The Start of the Period of Repose
Under the proposal, the repose period is measured from the date of
manufacture of the product.' 2' This starting date was selected to
allow the parties to be as certain as possible of their obligations and
rights. 22  Similar certainty, and fewer barred claims, could be
achieved by measuring each defendant's obligation from the date on
which it last sold or controlled the product.'12 3 That formulation,
120. See the New Hampshire statute, which limits claims against a person having
a legal duty to maintain or repair to twelve years after that person ceases to have
possession of the product or ceases to be under a duty to repair it. N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 507-D:2 (II)(b) (Supp. 1979).
121. The date of manufacture is used as an alternate starting date in the Utah
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977). The Illinois statute provides that
replacement of a component vith a substitute part having the same design will not
restart the statute for purposes of allowing a claim of defective design of the product
or the component. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 21.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982). By
giving the benefit of the statute running from the time the assembled product was
originally sold, this statute seems unduly protective of the manufacturer of the
substitute part. If the design of the component has been determined to be defective in
the intervening period, the manufacturer should not be able to continue supplying it
with that design without the extension of its exposure to liability. With respect to
manufacturing defects, the Illinois statute would presumably run from delivery of
the substitute component. See id.; Nat'l Product Liability Council, Proposed Uni-
form State Product Liability Act, reprinted in Product Liability Prevention Confer-
ence, Proceedings 185 (1978).
122. The proposal does not restart the repose period when the defendant or the
manufacturer regains possession of the product, for example, to recondition or repair
it, or when a government agency issues a recall or other safety order. Other statutes,
however, include a restart period. Ala. Code § 6-5-502(e)(1) (Supp. 1979) (manufac-
turer's repossession and government recall); I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 21.2(c)(2)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982) (manufacturer's repossession), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 507-D:2(II)(b) (Supp. 1981-1982) (same); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-02 (Supp.
1979) (same). Such a provision might seem fair because the parties would have notice
that exposure to liability was extended. In some industries, however, such a provision
would virtually eliminate the assurance that at some reasonably predictable time
there would be no liability. Most models of automobiles, for example, are subject to
one or more agency orders; since the timing of the orders varies widely, manufactur-
ers subject to a statute of repose with a restart provision would have to plan as though
no car would survive the extended repose period. Furthermore, a restart provision
could tempt manufacturers not to submit defect reports required by statute. See.
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976).
123. See Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a(a) (1981), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-
D:2(II)(a) (Supp. 1981-1982). See also the Kansas, North Carolina and Oregon
general statutes of repose, which run from the date of the defendant's act that gives
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however, would increase the risk that retailers and distributors would
be held liable for selling products that are defective according to
current standards, rather than according to the state of the art at the
time they were designed. 124 Starting the running of the statute, as
some states do, on the date when the product was first sold for use or
consumption 12 5 preserves the injured party's right to compensation in
a case when the product has a long shelf life in the hands of distribu-
tors and retailers; 2 6 however, it makes the manufacturer's period of
responsibility uncertain, since it is dependent on how long distributors
or retailers have kept the product on the shelf. Several of the statutes
have two different periods, one running from the date of manufacture
or sale by the defendant and the other from the first purchase of the
product for use or consumption.12 7 Unless the defendant's obligation
ends when the first of the two periods has run,12 8 the statute gives the
manufacturer no predictable end to liability.
3. End of the Period
The proposed statute provides that the "personal injury, death or
injury to property [for which damages are claimed must have] oc-
curred within eight years after" the period began to run. There are
three principal features to note about this part of the proposal: the
ending date is (1) certain, (2) generally applicable and (3) measured to
rise to a cause of action. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) (1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
52(16) (Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115(1) (1979). The Connecticut general tort
statutes of limitation also operate as statutes of repose because they are measured
from the date of the act or omission complained of. Prokolkin v. General Motors
Corp., 170 Conn. 289, 294-97, 365 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (1976); Conn. Rev. Gen.
Stat. § 52-577 (1981); id. § 52-584.
124. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
125. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp.
1978); Ga. Code Ann. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224(2)
(1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905(1) (1979);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(2)(b) (Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (1980).
Other statutes start the period with delivery to the original owner not in the business
of selling the product to a user or consumer. E.g., Idaho Code § 6-1303(1)(a) (Supp.
1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1981).
126. See Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New Immunity for
Product Suppliers, 1977 Ins. L.J. 535, 547.
127. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 22.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 411.310(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); N.D. Cent. Code § 28.01.1-02 (Supp.
1981); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977). These statutes are also intended to give the
manufacturer some certainty while accommodating the needs of consumers of prod-
ucts with extended shelf lives. The Tennessee statute alternatively runs from the
shorter of the first purchase for use or consumption or from the expiration of the
"anticipated life of the product," which is the expiration date placed on the product
by the manufacturer when required by law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (1980).
128. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 22.2(4)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-28-103(a) (1980).
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the injury, not commencement of the legal action. A certain end date
is a feature included in most enacted statutes of repose.120- A few,
however, measure the repose period by the "useful safe life'" of the
product. 130 Such a provision avoids the apparent arbitrariness of
subjecting products with widely varying expected life-spans to a single
standard.1 3' The transaction costs involved in avoiding arbitrariness
are, unfortunately, substantial. Under the Minnesota statute, for ex-
ample, a determination of whether the product's useful safe life has
expired must consider such factors as the wear and tear to which it has
been subjected, deterioration from natural causes, and the policies of
the user and similar users as to repairs, renewals and replace-
ments.132  Furthermore, expiration of useful safe life almost always
seems to be a jury question, since it is a defensive mattei to be
established by a preponderance of the evidence.133 The product seller
is given some relief by the inclusion of a statutory presumption, for
example, that harm caused more than ten years "after time of deliv-
ery" occurs after the expiration of the product's useful safe life. '3 That
presumption may be rebutted, however, by "clear and convincing
129. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (1982): Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.031(2)
(West 1982); Ga. Code Ann. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1981).
130. E.g., Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a(c) (1981): Idaho Code § 6-1303(1)
(Supp. 1981). The Minnesota statute measures the period by the product's "useful
life." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.03 (West Supp. 1981).
131. See Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at VII-23 to -24:
Phillips, supra note 13, at 673, see also Interagency Task Force Insurance Study,
supra note 22, at 4-93 (discussing insurance problems created when single rate
standard is adopted); Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at V-14
(dealing with legal problems a single standard would create). Allowance for differing
lives among products is also the purpose of statutes creating a rebuttable presumption
that the product is not defective after a specified number of years, e.g., Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 411.310(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980), and of statutes depriving the
plaintiff of the benefits of any presumption after a specified period. See, e.g., Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(9) (Supp. 1980).
132. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.03 (West Supp. 1981). accord Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat.
§ 52-577a (1981). The Idaho statute defines **useful safe life" only as "'the time during
which the product would normally be likely to perform or be stored in a safe
manner." Idaho Code § 6-1303 (Supp. 198i): see also Model Uniform Product
Liability Act § 110(A)(1)(a)-(e), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,732 (1979).
133. Idaho Code § 6-1303(i)(a) (Supp. 1981). The Minnesota statute does not
specify which party has the burden of proof, but says only that expiration of the
ordinary useful life of the product is "a defense to a claim." Minn. Stat. Ann. §
604.03 (West Supp. 1981). Under the Connecticut statute, -useful safe life" is a
concept by which the claimant may obtain an extension of the ten-year repose
period. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a(c),(d) (1981).
134. Idaho Code § 6-1303(2)(a) (Supp. 1981). The Minnesota statute does not
provide any presumptive period of useful life. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.03 (West Supp.
1981). The Connecticut statute is phrased in terms of a statute of repose of ten years,
with the claimant permitted to recover after that time if he can show that the
product's useful safe life was longer. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a (1981).
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evidence."' 35 A statute measured by the product's useful life or useful
safe life, even if limited by a fixed-term presumption, involves trans-
action costs that would seem largely to negate the possible benefits of
the statute. An attempt to recognize the wide variation in useful lives
by prescribing, through statute or regulation, different periods for
different products would also be difficult. 136  Tables such as those
established by the Internal Revenue Service 137 are not really appropri-
ate for incorporation by reference into the statute, and creating a new
statutory table for these purposes would be a mammoth undertak-
ing. 138  Besides, it is questionable whether the "useful safe life" of a
product is the correct criterion for the repose period. The long-tail
problem arises not only when products are used past their useful safe
lives; it is also related to changing technological standards, the diffi-
culties of providing proof after the passage of years, and product
modifications. 139 Because the proposed statute is intended to address
these problems, the ending date is not only certain but also generally
applicable to all products.
In order to make it clear that the statute of repose is not just a
statute of limitation, the ending date of the repose period is the date of
the injury, not the commencement of the action. 40 Statutes of limi-
tation are generally treated as procedural for purposes of conflict of
laws, so the forum applies its own limitation period regardless of
135. Idaho Code § 6-1303(2)(a) (Supp. 1981).
136. Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at VII-28.
137. Id. at VII-27; Interagency Task Force Industry Study, supra note 23, at VII-
11 to -13.
138. See Statutes of Repose, supra note 13, at 177-78.
139. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text. See generally Massery, supra
note 126, at 543-44, 547 (distinguishing between products with long useful lives and
those with long shelf lives). To the extent that the long-tail problem is one of tie
products being used past their useful lives, manufacturers could be given some
additional protection by being permitted to make effective disclaimers. See Inter-
agency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at 24-29, cf. Velez v. Craine & Clark
Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305 N.E.2d 750, 753-54, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617,
622-23 (1973) (analogy to UCC waiver and disclaimer provisions). The practicality of
this remedy is limited by questions regarding the effectiveness of disclaimers when
the parties do not have equal bargaining power, as well as when the injured person is
outside the chain of privity. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977);lnteragency Task Force Legal
Study, supra note 23, at V-27 to -28; cf. Johnson, supra note 61, at 691 n.69
(suggesting that manufacturers may limit liability by specifying useful life on the
product).
140. Eight statutes are measured to the date of injury. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
12-551 (1982); Ga. Code Ann. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 6-1303
(Supp. 1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.310(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(9) (Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.03 (West
Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 28.01.1-02 (Supp. 1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1981). The other statutes are measured to the commencement of
an action. E.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2(II) (Supp. 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1-50(6) (Supp. 1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905(1) (1979).
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which state's substantive law is applied.' 4' If the repose period were
so treated, New York manufacturers would be less likely to receive the
statute's protection in out-of-state actions by non-resident plain-
tiffs. 142  The other reason to end the repose period with the date of
injury is to avoid application of tolling provisions, such as absence
from the jurisdiction and infancy, that may serve to extend the statute
of limitations. 143 The rationale behind tolling provisions makes them
inapplicable to statutes of repose. Tolling provisions are intended to
excuse the plaintiff who might otherwise be thought to be sleeping on
his rights; the policies underlying the statute of repose make such
consideration of the plaintiff's conduct irrelevant. 44
For purposes of determining the end of the repose period, the
occurrence of the injury should be defined the same wvay as is the
accrual of the cause of action for the statute of limitations. This
approach will ensure no difference in result regardless of how continu-
ous exposure and undetected injuries are treated.' 45  Thus, if the
plaintiff takes a drug at year five after sale by the manufacturer and
discovers its adverse effects at year fifteen, the claim will be barred by
the statute of limitations if the New York courts continue to measure
that statute from the tortious ingestion, 46 and by the statute of repose
if there should be a rule adopted saying the injury takes place at its
discovery. 147
The eight-year period selected for the proposal is obviously arbi-
trary; statutes adopted to date have repose periods of three to twelve
141. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 588-89, 374 N.E.2d 97,
99, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187-88 (1978): see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43
N.Y.2d 389, 397-98, 372 N.E.2d 555, 559, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 771-72 (1977).
142. Interagency Task Force Final Report, supra note 14, at %II-24. If New York
had a substantive statute of repose, and a manufacturer from a state without such a
statute were sued in New York by a New York plaintiff, the defendant manufacturer
probably could not rely on the statute under a choice-of-law analysis focusing on the
governmental interests involved because the manufacturer would not be within the
statutory purpose of protecting New York defendants. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750-51 (1963). If,
however, the choice-of-law analysis focuses on the place of the injury or the place
where the product was purchased, see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128-29,
286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70-71 (1972). the out-of-state manufac-
turer might in some circumstances be able to avail itself of the New York statute's
protections.
143. The Indiana, North Dakota, Tennessee and Utah statutes explicitly exclude
tolling for minority or legal disability. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp.
1981) (measured to commencement of the action): N.D. Cent. Code § 28.01.1-02
(Supp. 1981) (measured to injury); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (1980) (measured to
commencement); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977) (measured to injur').
144. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
145. See Phillips, supra note 13, at 667-69.
146. See cases cited supra note 76.
147. See sources cited supra note 77.
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years, with the majority at ten. 148 Eight years was selected with the
idea that it would preclude less than four percent of claims' 4 and, in
most cases, would enable sellers to close their books on products after
eleven years due to the eight-year statute of repose and a further
three-year limitation period in which the injured plaintiff must bring
his claim.' 50 The exceptions to the eleven-year period would occur
when there are express warranties, when indemnification or contribu-
tion claims are asserted or when the statute of limitations is tolled; the
defendant can plan for the former class and the latter two groups are
not likely to be statistically significant.
4. Consequences of the Running of the Period
Under the proposal, expiration of the eight-year period is a com-
plete bar to recovery for any subsequent injury. This consequence is
more certain, and thus more desirable under the criteria here em-
ployed, than provisions in some of the statutes which only create a
rebuttable presumption that the product is not defective 5' or that its
useful safe life has passed' 5 2 after the statutory period has expired.
5. Exceptions
The only exceptions in the proposal are for claims arising out of
duties of maintenance and repair and for cases in which the defendant
has knowledge that the period is extended, that is, when there is an
express warranty. Other exceptions, such as for failures to warn of
known defects,' 5: for injuries caused by prolonged exposure,' 54 or for
defects or injuries not discoverable within the repose period, 155 would
148. E.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2(II) (Supp. 1979); R.I. Gen. Laws §
9-1-13(2) (Supp. 1980); cf. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 (1981) (general tort
statute of limitation measured three years from the complained of act or omission).
149. See supra notes 47-48, 51 and accompanying text. A ten-year statute would
allow recovery for an additional 0.8% of injured parties overall, but would reduce
the capital goods claims barred from 21.5% to 16.5%. Assuming that the claimants
in the latter category are less needy because of the workers' compensation remedy,
reducing the protection accorded capital goods manufacturers by only a quarter does
not seem to be worthwhile.
150. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Implied warranty
claims are measured from the date of sale, so the four-year warranty statute would
have run before the period of repose was up. The possibility of indemnification and
contribution claims could, of course, extend this period. See supra notes 107-08 and
accompanying text.
151. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1978); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
411.310(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980).
152. E.g., Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a(c) (1981); Idaho Code § 6-1403(2)(a)
(Supp. 1981).
153. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-02(3) (Supp. 1981).
154. Idaho Code § 6-1403(2)(b)(4) (Supp. 1981).
155. E.g., id.; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 22.2(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
The Tennessee statute has an explicit exception for injuries caused by asbestos. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (1980).
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reduce the certainty provided by the statute and increase its transac-
tion costs. 1 56
B. Constitutional Considerations
A statute of repose of the sort suggested will undoubtedly be sub-
jected to constitutional challenges, but it should be impervious to
them. The only product liability statutes that have been struck down
to date were invalidated on the basis of constitutional provisions not
found in the New York constitution.' 5 7 Statutes of repose for archi-
tects and builders'58 have been found unconstitutional in eleven states
156. During the writing of this Article, the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate
Commerce Committee published a second draft of its proposed product liability
legislation. Proposed Product Liability Act (Consumer Subcomm., Senate Commerce
Comm., Working Draft No. 2, Mar. 1, 1982), reprinted in Legal Times, March 8,
1982, at 24. The legislation, which, if enacted, would preempt state law, creates a
twenty-five year statute of repose for capital goods. The statute provides that a
plaintiff alleging defective design may not bring a claim for injuries that occur more
than twenty-five years from the date of delivery of the product to a non-seller. The
statute is well drafted in that the injury must occur within the statutory period: it
places no such limitation on initiation of the cause of action. See supra note 129 and
accompanying text. Unfortunately, the statute also contains a number of poorly
conceived provisions. A twenty-five year period of repose is likely to have little effect
on the number of claims or payments. Data from the ISO Survey indicate that less
than 14% of the claims and 12.5% of payments would be cut off by a statute with a
twelve-year period. ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 82. After twenty-five years, few of
those claims could be expected to remain. The percentage of claims will not be
significantly affected by the fact that the proposed statute defines capital goods more
broadly than did the ISO survey. Compare Proposed Product Liability Act § 25
(capital goods defined as product depreciable under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954) with ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 519-24 (listing fifty-two specific goods).
While the number of goods included in the definition will increase, the percentage of
non-capital goods claims remaining after twelve, and presumably twenty-five, years
is even less than that of capital goods. See ISO Survey, supra note 13, at 81. In
addition, because such an approach will reduce the impact upon transaction costs, a
statute of repose should not limit its scope to injuries caused by unsafe design. See
supra note 99 and accompanying text. The statute is also deficient in that it fails to
exclude from coverage claims based on express warranties. Manufacturers who make
such promises should not be provided with a statutory means to avoid them. Finally,
the statute also provides that its provisions do not affect the right of any party subject
to liability to seek indemnity and contribution from any other person responsible for
the harm. This section is unnecessary. As long as the harm occurred during the
statutory period, the right to make claims-over will be automatically preserved.
157. In Batilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1980), the court,
following Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (striking
down the architects and engineers statute of repose), applied Florida's -open courts"
constitutional provision. The South Carolina statute of repose was struck down in
Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 284 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. App. 1981), because it
violated that state's constitution that preserves every person's right to remedy injuries
inflicted upon him. S.C. Const. art. I, § 18.
158. See McGovern Address, supra note 26, at 16. Every state except Arizona,
Iowa, Kansas, New York, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin has an architects
and contractors statute of repose. Ala. Code § 6-5-218 (1975): Alaska Stat. §
774 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
on three principal bases: due process, equal protection and provisions
peculiar to particular state constitutions. 59 None of these bases
09.10.055 (1980); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-237, -239 (1979): Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§
337.1, .15 (West Supp. 1981); Colo Rev. Stat. § 13-80-127 (1978); Conn. Rev. Gen.
Stat. § 52-584(a) (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974): D.C. Code Encycl. §
12-310 (West 1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3) (West Supp. 1981): Ga. Code Ann. §
3-1006 (1975); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 657-8 (1976); Idaho Code § 5-241 (1979): I11.
Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 58 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20-2
(Burns 1973); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.135 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 9.2772 (West Supp. 1981); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 752-A (1978): Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-108 (1977); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 260, § 2B (Michie/
Law. Co-op. 1980); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5839 (1968): Minn. Stat. Ann. §
541.051 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-41 (1972); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
516.097 (Vernon 1982); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-208 (1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-
223 (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 311.205 (1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-b (1968):
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1.1 (West 1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-27 (1978): N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5) (Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-44 (1974): Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2305.131 (Page 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 109, 110 (West 1981-
1982); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.135 (1979); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 5536 (Purdon Supp.
1981); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-29 (Supp. 1981); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-640 to -670
(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 15-2-9, -11 (1967); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 28-3-202 (1980); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. tit. 91, art. 5536a (Vernon 1980):
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953); Va. Code § 8.01-250 (1977); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 34.16.310 (Supp. 1981); Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-111 (1977). In 1968 the New York
Law Revision Commission, utilizing a study by Professor Martin Fogelman, recom-
mended against enactment of a statute of repose. N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n,
Recommendation and Study Relating to a Statute of Limitations Applicable to
Actions Against Architects, Engineers and Building Contractors, in Reports, Recom-
mendations and Studies 241 (1968) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n
Study]. Kansas has a statute of repose applicable to tort actions in which the injury is
not reasonably discoverable at the time it is incurred. See supra note 36. There are
also statutes of repose for medical malpractice actions in twenty-five states: Ala.
Code § 6-5-482 (1975); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.5 (West Supp. 1981); Conn. Rev.
Gen. Stat. § 52-584 (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6856 (1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
95.11(4) (West Supp. 1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 657-7.3 (1976); I11. Ann. Stat. cl.
83, § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(9) (West Supp.
1979); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(c) (1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1) (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980); La. Rev, Stat. Ann. § 9:5628 (West Supp. 1981); Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-109 (1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-205 (1981); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-222 (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41A.097 (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15(c)
(Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-18(3)(1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.11
(Page 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 18 (West 1981-1982): Or. Rev. Stat. §
12.110(4) (1979); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545 (Law. Co-op. 1980); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-26-116 (1980); Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 521
(Supp. 1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.16.350 (Supp. 1981). None of these medical
malpractice statutes has been held unconstitutional by the highest court of any state.
There has been, however, a lower court decision, which was subsequently reversed,
against the constitutionality of the Illinois statute. Woodward v. Burnham City
Hosp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 285, 377 N.E.2d 290 (1978), rev'd, 79 I11. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d
560 (1979). But see Anderson v. Wagner, 61 Ill. App. 3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (1978),
aff'd, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979). See generally McGovern, The Variety,
Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L.
Rev. 579, 632-37 (1981).
159. Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975) (void for
vagueness); Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 294 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306
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should be availing against a product liability statute of repose in New
York.
The heart of the due process argument is that a statute of repose
operates to deprive an injured person of a cause of action for his
injuries.1 60 This argument has been consistently rejected. The courts
agree that while a remedy may not be abolished once a right vests-
that is, after the injury has occurred-the right itself may be abol-
ished.' 6' The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the
authority of state legislatures, in the exercise of their police powers, to
modify or abolish common-law rights of action. 62  The New York
Court of Appeals took the same position when it upheld the state's
automobile no-fault law against a due process attack in Montgomery
v. Daniels.163  When a statute is challenged on non-procedural
grounds as violative of due process of law, the only question is
whether there is" 'some fair, just and reasonable connection' between
it and the promotion of the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of
society."' 6 4 So long as the legislation is in pursuance of permissible
(1974) (violated clear tile and single subject requirement); Overland Constr. Co. v.
Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (violated open court provision), Fujioka v. Kam,
55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973) (violated equal protection guarantee and prohibi-
tion on special grant of exclusive privilege or immunity): Skinner v. Anderson, 38 111.
2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (same); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.V.2d 218 (Ky. 1973)
(violated prohibition on abolishing negligence cause of action): Muzar v. Metro
Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.V.2d 850 (1978) (violated equal
protection); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.V.2d 548 (Minn.
1977) (violated prohibition on grant of special or exclusive privilege or immunity);
Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977) (violated
equal protection); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978) (same);
Kallas Millvork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.V.2d 454 (1975)
(same); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (\Vyo. 1980) (violated open
courts requirement and prohibition on grant of special or exclusive privilege or
immunity). New York does not have the peculiar state constitutional provisions on
which the Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota and \yoming
courts relied. See generally Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at V-
12 to -13; Product Liability in Alabama, supra note 18, at 171-80.
160. See, e.g., Hill v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977); McGovern, supra note 157, at 627 nn. 123-24. Concern about possibly
violating due process was one reason the Law Revision Commission rejected a
proposal for a statute of repose for architects, engineers and building contractors in
1968. N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Study, supra note 158, at 246.
161. E.g., Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 113, 551 P.2d 647, 652 (1976):
Rosenberg v. Town of Northern Bergen, 61 N.J. 190. 199-200, 293 A.2d 662, 667
(1972); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. 441, 449-51,
341 A.2d 184, 188-89 (1975), affd. 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978). The New York
Constitution specifically grants to the Legislature the authority to change the com-
mon law. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 14.
162. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (dictum).
163. 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
164. Id. at 54, 340 N.E.2d at 451,.378 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (quoting Nettleton Co. v.
Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 193, 264 N.E.2d 118, 123, 31 N.Y.S.2d 625, 633 (1970),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Reptile Products Ass'n. v. Diamond, 401 U.S. 969 (1971)).
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state objectives and the means adopted are reasonably related to the
accomplishment of those objectives,6 5 the courts should not be con-
cerned with whether the legislature's response to the problem is the
wisest possible or whether it will surely accomplish the ends
sought.'66 Thus, in the context of product liability, the legislature
could reasonably conclude that current law contributes to vexatious
litigation in the state's courts and a weakening of the state's economic
development, 67 and that a statute of repose could help alleviate those
problems.
The Montgomery court did not decide, but certainly did cast sub-
stantial doubt on, the argument that it is a deprivation of due process
to abrogate a common-law right to sue in tort without providing an
adequate substitute remedy.16 8  As the court noted, early United
States Supreme Court dictum supporting the argument' 69 has been
severely, if not totally, undercut by pronouncements in later cases. 70
Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a statute of repose would be struck
down for failure to provide an adequate substitute remedy.
A statute of repose that was measured to the commencement of the
action could be subject to due process objection if it did not provide an
extension when the injury took place close to the end of the statutory
period. 17 1  Otherwise, the right that accrued within the statutory
period would, as a practical matter, be denied any remedy, and a due
process violation would occur.17 2  One solution would be to extend
the statutory period when the injury occurs within, for example, the
last two years of the stated period.173 A better solution, for reasons
noted above, 174 is to measure the statute of repose to the date of injury
and independently to apply the statute of limitations from that date.
165. See 38 N.Y.2d at 54, 340 N.E.2d at 452, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
166. Id. at 56, 340 N.E.2d at 453, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
167. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text; cf. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38
N.Y.2d 41, 55-56, 340 N.E.2d 444, 452-53, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 13 (1975) (discussing
connection between money wasted in protracted automobile accident litigation and
implementation of no-fault insurance).
168. 38 N.Y.2d at 56-57, 340 N.E.2d at 453-54, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 13-14: see, e.g..
Reeves v. Ille Elee. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 113, 551 P.2d 647, 652 (1976).
169. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) (Court doubts
whether the state could abolish all rights and defenses without producing adequate
substitute).
170. 38 N.Y.2d at 56-57, 340 N.E.2d at 453, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 14 (citing Silver v.
Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (dictum); Arizona Employers' Liab. Cases, 250 U.S.
400, 421 (1919) (dictum)).
171. Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at V-13, Linmitation of
Action Statutes, supra note 29, at 373.
172. See Gibbe v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 263, 332 (1933).
173. The Indiana statute adopts this approach. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-5
(Burns Supp. 1981).
174. See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
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Such a statute would also avoid the necessity of providing tolling
provisions to protect the remedies of, for example, infant plaintiffs.'T5
The equal protection argument, the most successful of those em-
ployed against the architect's statutes of repose, '-, focuses on the
distinction such statutes often make between architects and designers
on the one hand, and builders and owners on the other.'-, Courts
upholding constitutional challenges made on this basis have decided
that there is no rational basis for the classification made by the statute;
without the statute members of each group are subjected to the same
soft of long-term liability, with equal difficulties in obtaining insur-
ance or other means to protect themselves.171
A broadly written statute of repose for product liability, by con-
trast, would not be subject to this sort of equal protection attack
because its protections would extend to all sellers, lessors, licensors and
bailors now subject to liability for products defectively designed, man-
ufactured, packaged or labelled. Furthermore, even a statute more
narrowly defined should not be subject to an equal protection chal-
lenge as long as a rational basis can be shown for the distinctions it
draws. 79 For example, a statute protecting only the manufacturers
and sellers of capital goods could be justified by legislative findings
that the problems of obtaining insurance are most serious for those
persons and that the economic effect of long-tail claims varies more
widely between older and newer manufacturers in this industry than
in others.180 Furthermore, the legislature could note that the class of
175. See Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 234, 510 P.2d 879, 882 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1974) (striking down notice-of-claim statute for lack of toll
during minority). But see Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866
(1952) (upholding provision requiring a one-year notice of claim for a tort action
brought by a minor against a public corporation).
176. McGovern, supra note 158, at 596 n.98. Equal protection analysis tends to be
used in striking down statutes of repose under provisions prohibiting special class
legislation. Product Liability in Alabama, supra note 18, at 176-80. New York has no
"special class" provision in its constitution.
177. E.g., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 11-12, 514 P.2d 568, 571 (1973); Broome
v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 230-31, 241 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1978); see Skinner v.
Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 460, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591 (1967) (violated prohibition
against "special privilege" legislation).
178. See supra note 177. But see, e.g., O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 117-19,
335 A.2d 545, 550-51 (1975); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa.
270, 276-78, 382 A.2d 715, 718-20 (1978).
179. The Court of Appeals applies the "rational basis" test to equal protection
claims in the area of economics and social welfare legislation: "strict scrutiny" is
applied only when a challenged law creates a classification drawn along suspect
lines, such as race, or impairs a fundamental constitutional right, such as security of
the person. An intermediate standard may be applied to some other "suspect" classifi-
cations. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 59-61, 340 N.E.2d 444, 455-57, 378
N.Y.S.2d 1, 16-18 (1975).
180. See Interagency Task Force Legal Study, supra note 23, at V-10, -11, -14:
supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text: cf. Massery, supra note 126, at 547
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persons most often injured by these products almost always has access
to other compensation;Ill in Montgomery v. Daniels, the Court of
Appeals employed similar reasoning to uphold the distinction between
insured and uninsured plaintiffs under the automobile no-fault law.1 2
The unlikelihood of a successful due process or equal protection
attack on a product liability statute of repose in New York is further
suggested by the Court of Appeals' continuing adherence to the rule
that the statute of limitations runs from the tortious invasion even for
undiscoverable personal injuries. The effect of that rule is the same as
that of a statute of repose: Even the injured person who has not slept
on his rights because there was no way he could have asserted his
claim within the statutory period is barred from recovery.1 3  Chief
Judge Desmond, dissenting in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical
Corp., 8 4 argued that this deprivation of a remedy before the plaintiff
could assert his right might pose constitutional problems. 85 Never-
theless, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly reaffirmed the doc-
trine.'86
The state constitutional provision most likely to cause difficulty in
New York is article I, section 16. It states: "The right of action now
existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never
be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation."'' 8 7  This provision was the basis for striking
down New York's first workers' compensation law in 1913.18s  Con-
cern about the effect of section 16 also led to excluding death cases
from the coverage of the automobile no-fault law.8 9
The argument against a statute of repose under section 16 would be
that cutting off some claims before the person is killed abrogates the
(shorter limitations imposed by notice-of-claim provisions for actions against govern-
mental entities have been upheld because of special need to protect the public fisc).
181. See supra notes 84, 89 and accompanying text.
182. 38 N.Y.2d at 62, 340 N.E.2d at 457, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
183. E.g., Phillips, supra note 13, at 672; Limitation of Action Statutes, supra
note 29, at 378-79.
184. 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
185. Id. at 219-20, 188 N.E.2d at 146, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20 (Desmond, C.J.,
dissenting). The Chief Judge cited, inter alia, Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163
(1949), which dealt with the unreasonableness, but not the unconstitutionality, of
barring a claim before the plaintiff could know and assert it. Id.
186. See sources cited supra note 76.
187. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 16.
188. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 304-05, 94 N.E. 431, 443-44 (1911).
Section 18, originally § 19, was added to article 1 of the constitution in 1913 to
authorize the workers' compensation law. Shanahan v. Monarch Eng'g Co., 219
N.Y. 469, 473-74, 114 N.E. 795, 796 (1916).
189. See N.Y. State Insurance Dep't, Automobile Insurance. . . For Whose Bene-
fit? 86 n.139 (1970), The provision was also a source of concern when the Law
Revision Commission was considering a statute of repose for architects. N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n Study, supra note 158, at 244-45.
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right to recover for injuries resulting in death, which now exists
regardless of when the injury occurs relative to the defendant's posses-
sion or control of the product. A proper reading of the constitutional
provision and its legislative history, however, strongly indicates that it
should be no impediment to a statute of repose even in death cases.
First, section 16 speaks of "the right of action now existing" for
wrongful death; it thus speaks as of the provision's effective date,
January 1, 1895.190 At that time, there was almost no product liabil-
ity actiof in the modern sense: a negligence claim required pri'ity" in
almost all instances; 191 recover), for personal injuries under a breach
of warranty theory required privity' 92 and was very severely limited
by strict notions of foreseeable consequences; ,9 3 and there was no
"strict products liability" tort theory.'9 4 Thus, only the very rare
wrongful death plaintiff nowadays would be asserting a claim for
which recovery would have been granted in 1895. Furthermore, even
in such a case the legislative history of section 16 makes clear that it
was intended to preserve inviolate the wrongful death cause of action,
not the underlying causes of action which the decedent might have
asserted had he lived and on which a successful wrongful death cause
of action depends.' 9 5 The intent was to preserve to the beneficiaries
the simple right to recover in circumstances in which the decedent
could have recovered if he were alive'9 6 and especially to preserve that
cause of action without the limitation on damages which the legisla-
ture had adopted.' 97 The primary purpose of the constitutional pro-
vision was thus to ensure equality of treatment between living victims
of tortfeasors and the statutory beneficiaries of deceased victims of
tortfeasors-put simply, it should not be cheaper to kill a person than
to injure him. 98  Since the "cause of action" preserved in section 16 is
the wrongful death cause of action, not the cause of action that
determines whether the death "was caused by the wrongful act, ne-
glect, or default of another ...who would have been liable in an
action in favor of the deceased if death had not ensued," 9 a statute of
190. In re Meng, 227 N.Y. 264, 273-74, 125 N.E. 508. 510 (1919). The present §
16 of article 1 was then § 18.
191. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916).
192. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
193. Birdsinger v. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co., 183 N.Y. 487, 493-94, 76
N.E. 611, 613-14 (1906).
194. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
195. See In re Meng, 227 N.Y. 264, 274-78, 125 N.E. 508, 510-12 (1919).
196. See 2 W. Steele, Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894, at
625 (1900) [hereinafter cited as Record of Constitutional Convention].
197. Amerman v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 45 A.D.2d 996, 998, 358 N.Y.S.2d 220, 204
(1974); 1 Record of Constitutional Convention, supra note 196, at 1106-27.
198. 1 Record of Constitutional Convention, supra note 196, at 1104-05: see 2 id.
at 606-26.
199. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1966) (emphasis added).
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repose that applies equally in both death and personal injury cases
should not be barred by section 16.
CONCLUSION
The available data suggest that a statute of repose would have little
effect in New York, except possibly in permitting some reduction in
the cost of product liability insurance for capital goods manufactur-
ers. For other manufacturers, the incidence of successful claims that
would be barred by the statute is already so low as to make any
reduction of the insurance rates unlikely. Among those whose claims
would be barred by the statute, few would be left totally without
compensation. Almost all those injured by capital goods are covered
by the workers' compensation system, and many among the relatively
few not so protected have access to other sources of compensation,
such as first-party insurance. Thus, whatever ills attend the current
situation in product liability law-and there are many-adoption of a
statute of repose would seem to be only tinkering, not a step toward
their ultimate cure;
